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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

This Reply will comment on the Brief of respondent,
treating the various portions in the order in which they are
presented in the Brief:
ISSUES PRESENTED
At page

1 respondent

being the issues in this case.

states three propositions

as

Plaintiffs answer question No. 1:

Yes, where the building permit issued by the City gives designated
parking spaces and the building is constructed in reliance on
the building permit, business is developed to utilize the parking
spaces and all of the spaces have been in constant use without
interference until the events involved in this action.
Question No. 2 is really two questions in one. Plaintiffs
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do not deny that the City may alter the use of its streets to
meet reasonable police power objectives by redesigning the street?
but the second portion of the question is not admitted.

Our

position is that the City cannot eliminate space allocated for
vehicle or pedestrian access to the owner's private property
without paying compensation.
The third question is ambiguous and also needs an
explanation.

It is necessary to distinguish between a physical

taking of property and a taking of property rights which have
been established and are recognized; and furthermore, our position
is that reasonable access is not provided where all the access
does is permit patrons to drive on to the property but denies
the utilization of the property as to number of parking spaces,
the nature of the business which can be carried on in the buildings
adjacent to the parking spaces, and where the destruction of
reasonable access to the parking spaces has caused severe damage
to the value of the plaintiffs' properties.
CONTROLLING STATUTES
Plaintiffs do not rely on § 78-12-13, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended.

Plaintiffs do not challenge the right and

power of the City to establish a median strip, to construct
a viaduct, to eliminate U-turns or left-hand turns, or to widen
streets as a means of regulating the flow of traffic, but those
are not the issues in this case.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
In Paragraph 1 on page 3, plaintiffs take issue with
the statement that plaintiffs and their customers reached the
parking spaces "by driving over a sidewalk".

It is true that

the access to the parking spaces was from the street to an area
in front of the plaintiffs1 buildings.

There was neither a

gutter nor a sidewalk in front of either building (R. 263, 326,
371, 372, 381).
The statement in Paragraph 2 is inaccurate and incomplete.
Actually, the City acquiesced in the position of plaintiffs
that they were entitled to compensation for loss of parking
if a portion of plaintiffs1 property was to be physically appropriated (R. 270, 271, 273, 279, 283).

It is true that the City

offered to pay for the actual property physically appropriated
and when plaintiffs were not willing to abandon their claim
for compensation, the City carved out a new plan, taking a strip
of property from each of the owners in order to build a sidewalk
but excluding the property of the two plaintiffs so as to avoid
a physical appropriation

(Appellants1 Brief, pp. 18-19).

By

doing this the City recognized that if it physically appropriated
a strip of plaintiffs1 property, the consequential damages to
parking rights would follow.

The result is a uniform street

with sidewalks and curbs except for the property of the two
plaintiffs, as shown on Exhibits D25, D30, D36, D39, D40, D41.
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Paragraph 3 on page 3 touches the real issue which
divides the parties.

Judge Daniels felt compelled to determine

whether there was a "taking" and found that there was no compensable
damage if there was no physical taking and if a "reasonable
access" to the property of plaintiffs survived.

The actual

facts were as stated in plaintiffs1 Brief (pp. 13 to 15) that
plaintiffs obtained building permits giving them specific front
parking spaces, which were marked, constructed their building
in reliance on access to each of those parking spaces, and now
the curb as placed has prevented access to any of those parking
spaces in the established manner but does permit vehicles to
reach that area, accommodating only one in front of the Three
D building because there is no means of going forward and if
a second car came in, the first one could not get out.

This

is true also of the Distributors building because with one car
parked in the space, the second car would have to back out into
the street, permitting at most two cars.

If two cars parked

abreast, they would have to block the area reserved for sidewalk
use, which most people will not do, thus leaving as effective
parking one space for the Three D building and one or at most
two for the Distributors building (Appellants1 Brief, pp. 11-13).
This is a taking of property rights and causes substantial damage
to plaintiffs1 properties.
Paragraph 4 on page 4 mentions "driving over a sidewalk",
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which was not strictly true because there was no sidewalk until
the City improved the area and placed sidewalks in front of
all the properties except those of plaintiffs.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
On page 4 respondent states that this is not a case
in inverse condemnation.

That seems not to make any difference,

since the Second Cause of Action is based on demand and notice
to the City and raises the same issues.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PLAINTIFFS HAD NO OWNERSHIP INTEREST
IN THE PUBLIC PARKING SPACES
At page 5 respondent cites Ingram v. Salt Lake City,
51 Utah Adv.Rep. 6,

P.2d

(Utah 1987), and Standard

Optical v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 535 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1975),
neither of which has anything whatsoever to do with access to
private property.

Plaintiffs do not contend that there was

any acquisition of easement by adverse use.

The City issued

building permits designating front parking spaces and the buildings
were constructed in reliance on that.

To refer to these as

"long lost building plans" ignores both the facts and the significance of the building permits.

The issuance of the permits

and the designation of parking spaces and the building in reliance
are covered in plaintiffs1 Brief at pages 8 to 10.
McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, U 26.215, says
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in part:
The general rule is that, although a building
permit does not in itself confer or alter
vested rights, investment, expenditures,
or work under it may give rise to property
rights entitled to protection of the law
as such.
And again in 11 30.63, McQuillin states:
The most important right of the abutter
incident to his ownership of property abutting
on the street or alley is his right of access,
i.e., his right of ingress and egress . . . It
includes not merely the right of the abutting
owner to go into and come out of his premises
but also the right to have the premises
accessible to patrons, clients, customers
and visitors generally, with a degree of
convenience and ease which in the circumstances
are reasonable. Accordingly, the measure
of the right of an abutter to access to
a street is reasonable ingress and egress
under all the circumstances.
In most jurisdictions this right of access
is held to be a proprietary right, an easement
in the street attached to the estate or
ownership of property abutting on a street
or alley; . . .
On page 6 respondent quotes two sentences from Utah
State Road Commission v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926 at 928, but stops
short of the statements which have a bearing on this case, to
wit:
Thus, no private property right is taken
by the construction of a median divider,
since the abutting owner has no property
right in the free flow of traffic past his
place of business. However, where a police
power is exercised as an incidental result
of the exercise of eminent domain, just
compensation is due if the market value
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of the property has been diminished. The
constitutional guarantee of just compensation
for the taking or damaging of private property
for public use is in no way affected by
the fact that the expropriator is exercising
the police power. The rights of access,
light, and air are easements appurtenant
to the land of an abutting owner on a street;
they constitute property rights forming
part of the owner's estate. These substantial
property rights, although subject to reasonable
regulation, may not be taken away or impaired
without just compensation.
POINT II
THE PLAINTIFFS' "DAMAGES" FOR THE CITY'S POLICE
POWER ALTERATION OF ITS STREETS ARE
"DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA"
At page 10 of respondent's Brief it is stated and
argued that:
Damage claims for loss of access to parking
have consistently been rejected across the
country.
It then cites five cases as supporting that general statement
and as having some application to the facts of this case.
The Brief states that Johnson v. Burke County, 101
Ga.App. 747, 115 S.E.2d 484 (1960), is "under almost identical
facts." The Court there upheld a general demurrer to the Complaint
because the Complaint plus the attached diagrams show "no substantial
interference with the means of ingress, egress or regress" and
because the curb as it was constructed does "not interfere with
the right of the plaintiffs, their customers or others, in the
matter of ingress or egress."

The implication is that if there
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were such interference, damages would be recoverable even though
there were no physical taking of the property.
Respondent cites City of Phoenix v. Ward, 5 Ariz . App. 505,
428 P.2d 450, 453 (1967).

This case involved a private residence,

to serve which the owner had built a garage and a carport which
had direct access to the street and to the opposite side of
the street.

A curbing was placed in front of the property but

did not close the entrance to the owner's carport and what was
prohibited was left turns into the owner's property and the
necessity that the owner would have to back on to the street
rather than be able to drive forward on to the street.
Respondent cites City of Orlando v. Cullom, 400 So. 2d
513 (Fla. App. 1981) , where a 200-foot-long street, which was
previously a one-way street, was closed and instead a mall with
trees and decorations limited to pedestrian traffic was created.
This eliminated parking on the street which previously existed
but did not affect access to the property, since there had been
no ingress or egress to or from that street.

The court held

that there was no special damage to this one owner, but it was
an improvement affecting all of the owners on the street and
they still had access to their property but no means of parking
on a public thoroughfare, which is a matter subject to regulation
by the city.

This case has nothing to do with established access

to the property of the owners.
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Snyder v. State, 538 P.2d 920 (Idaho 1968), also was
a case where parking on the street was eliminated as a means
of controlling traffic and regulating traffic, which is within
the police power. Again, this case has nothing to do with blocking
established access to commercial property, in reliance upon
which buildings have been constructed and retail business has
been established.

It deals only with parking on a public street.

And finally, respondent cites Yegen v. City of Bismark,
291 N.W.2d 422 (N.D. 1980).

Here the plaintiff owned a grocery

store which had been approached through having customers park
on the public street in front of the store. The store had private
parking for two customers and one delivery truck, which was
not affected by the street improvement and the prohibition of
parking on the street.

The court cited Eck v. City of Bismark,

283 N.W.2d 193, which case cited with approval an earlier case,
King v. Stark County, 271 N.W. 771 (N.D. 1937).

That case is

interesting because it does involve interference with access
to private property resulting from a street improvement and
the court notes that whether the improvement interferes with
access by constructing something or by creating an unusual elevation,
it is still an interference which must be considered by the
court to determine whether there is compensable damage and the
extent of it.

The Complaint alleged that the improvement and

building of a new highway damaged the plaintiffs by preventing
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them from going to their residence, to their barnyard and stock
feeding establishment, by creating an unreasonably high grade
with unreasonably deep ditches, by removing lateral support
for the owner's right of way, and by preventing the owner from
crossing the highway as he previously did to reach his property.
The court reviewed the law in North Dakota and noted that at
common law a physical taking was necessary before consequential
damage could be recovered. But under the North Dakota Constitution,
the State was required to pay compensation for "damaging" as
well as for "taking" private property for public use and the
court stated at page 774:
Under it the courts have uniformly
held that there is liability not
only for property taken, but also
for consequential damages to property
arising from the acts of the authorities in constructing public works.
It is not necessary that there
be a direct injury to the property
itself in order to create this
liability.
It is sufficient to
warrant a recovery if there be
"some direct physical disturbance
of a right, either public or private,
which the plaintiff enjoys in
connection with his property,
and which gives to it an additional
value, and that by reason of such
disturbance he has sustained a
special damage with respect to
his property in excess of that
sustained by the public generally."
Rigney v. City of Chicago, supra;
Mason City, etc., Railway Company
v. Wolf, 148 F. 961, 78 C C A . 589.
And the diminution in value of
property resulting from the acts
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complained of is special and peculiar
within the meaning of the rule.
See Lewis, Eminent Domain (3d
Ed.) §§ 363 and 3 64, and the many
authorities cited there.
We urge this Court to review the law generally, the
Utah cases, and the Utah Constitution, which requires compensation
to owners of private property where their property is "taken
or damaged" for the benefit of the public.

Plaintiffs1 main

Brief has attempted to analyze the Utah cases and point out
that there are general statements which Judge Daniels has felt
constrained to follow.

We urge the Court to establish the dis-

tinction between physical taking of property and damaging of
appurtenant rights such as access, as pointed out in State v. Miya,
supra, but eliminate the requirement that there be a slight
physical taking as a necessary support for determining the "damage".
According to Nichols on Eminent Domain, the requirement
of a physical appropriation is no longer required by most courts:
f6.09 Non-physical Takings. Consideration
has previously been given herein to the
strict interpretation of the word "taking"
in the constitutional clause dealing with
eminent domain, by virtue of which a physical
appropriation of the property involved is
required. The weight of authority, however,
is not in support of this strict construction.
The modern, prevailing view is that any
substantial interference with private property
which destroys or lessens its value (or
by which the owner's right to its use or
enjoyment is in any substantial degree abridged
or destroyed) is, in fact and in law, a
"taking" in the constitutional sense, to
the extent of the damages suffered, even
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though the title and possession of the owner
remains undisturbed.
This view was recognized by the Idaho Supreme Court
in 1958 in Hughes v. State of Idaho, 328 P.2d 397, where the
Court was applying a constitutional provision which required
compensation for private property "taken" for public use and
does not include the word "damage".

In that case, the plaintiff

owned a parcel of commercial property with two points of access,
one from each of two streets, the property being a corner property.
Street improvement raised the elevation and eliminated ingress
and egress from one of the streets, for which the plaintiff
sought damage by inverse condemnation, in seeking damage to
their business, which resulted from this impairment of access.
The court observed that many states include damage as well as
taking in their constitutional provision and then approach the
question whether the impairment of access is a "taking" of property
and determine that the right of access a property right, citing
and relying on 29 C.J.S., Eminent Domain, 111! 105 and 163, and
then held:
Our review of Idaho's Constitution, statutes
and decisions, clearly shows that the power
of eminent domain extends to every kind
of property taken for public use, including
the right of access to public streets, such
being an estate or interest in and appurtenant
to real property; and since such right of
access constitutes an interest in, by virtue
of being an easement appurtenant to, a larger
parcel, the court, jury or referee must
ascertain and assess the damages which will
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accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned
by reason of the severance of the portion—the
right of access —sought to be condemned,
and the construction of the improvement.
I.C. sec. 7-711.
We therefore hold that appellants1 allegedly
destroyed right of business access to their
business property, if such be proven, constituted
a taking of their property, whether or not
accompanied by a taking of physical property,
and constituted an element of damage, as
does also any element of alleged taking
of their physical property, which must be
ascertained and assessed in accordance with
the legislative mandate of I.C. sec. 7-711.
(p. 402)
Also, in People v. Renaud, 198 Cal.App.2d 581, 17
Cal.Rptr. 674, 676, 677, the California court had a case similar
to our Miya case, supra, where a parcel of real property not
having much value was physically taken but where the chief damage
sought by the owner was damage from impairment of right of access
to the commercial property.

The court said:

A long line of cases has held that a property
owner abutting upon a public street or highway
has a property right in the nature of an
easement of ingress and egress to and from
his property, and that right cannot be taken
from him without just compensation . . .
The damage for taking an easement appurtenant
is measured by the injury to the land to
which it is appurtenant.
In that case the right of access was not totally destroyed,
but the construction of the freeway gave only indirect access
to the property which previously was accessed directly.
Respondent states that the Keiffer v. King County
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(1977), 89 Wash.2d 369, 572 P.2d 408, case relied on by the
appellants is a minority of one in the face of several cases
cited by respondent.

As pointed out above, none of respondent's

cases deals with the closing or impairing of established routes
of access on to private property.

We suggest that the only

case clearly against the position of plaintiffs is the decision
of Judge Daniels in this action.
Furthermore, in Keiffer, supra, there had been no
building permit issued which gave specific parking spaces and
there was no showing that the buildings had been constructed
in reliance on the building permit and the specific parking
spaces, thus giving the plaintiffs six in one case and seven
in the other case specific parking spaces with right of ingress
and egress from the street.

The closing of these access routes

was a taking under the authorities we have cited and certainly
was a damage to be measured by the reduction in the value of
the premises with and without the front parking, as to which
the testimony given is analzyed in plaintiffs1 main Brief at
pages 13-15.
The Brief of respondent completely ignores the fact
that it is plain from the evidence that Salt Lake City intended
the physical taking of a strip of private property all along
13 00 South Street and then gerrymandered its plans because the
plaintiffs had very substantial damage from loss of parking
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spaces and asked for compensation.

The City now attempts to

destroy substantially those parking rights without a physical
appropriation when it is apparent from the testimony and the
photographs that ultimately there will be a modified curb and
a sidewalk to be established in the future when the owners cannot
claim that they own rights to parking spaces.
SUMMARY
The defendant planned a special improvement district
to improve 13th South, making a four-lane street with curb,
gutter and sidewalk, taking a narrow strip of property from
the abutting owners for the gutter and sidewalk. But the plaintiffs
had front parking for their buildings and the retail businesses
which had been built up utilizing the front parking.
The City defendant decided to avoid the damage claims
for loss of parking by not taking any strip of land from these
plaintiffs and thus prevent successful assertion of damage to
their parking rights and access to their parking spaces.
The District Court took the view that there had to
be a taking by physical appropriation or unreasonable interference
with access which amounted to a taking.

The Court refused to

make Findings of Fact based on the evidence supporting plaintiffs1
theory of damage.
Here there was blocking of all access routes used
to reach the parking places as contained in the building plans
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on which the building permits were issued and the buildings
were constructed.

These access routes had been in constant

use for nearly thirty years.
Plaintiffs have suffered substantial damage peculiar
to their situations and their rights of access.

The retail

businesses have been virtually destroyed and the values of their
properties have been greatly reduced.
Regulation of traffic under the police power is not
the issue. The City has blocked the established routes of access.
The substituted access has so limited parking availability that
the damages indicated are unavoidable.
The property right of access over established routes
has been taken.

The rights of access have been so restricted

that great damage has been caused these plaintiffs and no other
property owners along 13th South Street.
The District Court erred in misinterpreting the cases
in Utah and elsewhere and in refusing to make Findings of Fact
on the issues presented.

The Conclusions of Law are in error

on the evidence presented.

The background of plaintiffs1 rights

and the extent of damage suffered by them entitles them to compensation under the Utah Constitution and the waiver of sovereign
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immunity statutes.
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